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LABOR ISSUES DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PANAMA CANAL 
 
 The story of the construction of the Panama Canal began on November 17, 1869, with the 
completion of the Suez Canal.  The Suez Canal was a moment of intense national pride and 
patriotic sentiment, a triumph felt by the entire nation of France.  Praised above all others for his 
work on the Suez Canal was Vicomte Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French engineer who oversaw 
almost every aspect of the construction of the Suez Canal, in spite of his lack of experience.  His 
motivation, his pride, and his passion to achieve success with the canal drove him past the 
traditional barriers of doubt and finances and enabled him to surpass the expectations of the 
world.  Ferdinand de Lesseps “had no interest in making money," as he professed.1  His interest 
was solely in the completion of the Suez Canal, and the completion of the canal was what he 
achieved. 
 De Lesseps managed and guided almost every detail of the construction of the Suez 
Canal, and, as described by historian David McCullough, went about his great project of the 
canal by fearlessly “overruling his technical advisors, defying the European bankers, and facing 
the scorn of the English prime minister, Palmerston, who called him a swindler and a fool and 
who saw the canal as nothing more than a cheap French grab for power in the Mediterranean.” 2  
                                                            
  1 David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas:  The Creation of the Panama Canal 
1870-1914 (New York:  Simon & Shuster Paperbacks, 1977), 53. 
 2Ibid. 
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 Still riding a wave of public support and admiration following the brilliant success of the 
Suez Canal, de Lesseps turned his gaze towards his next great project:  a canal to bridge the 
oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific.  For Vicomte Ferdinand de Lesseps, the failure of this venture 
ultimately led to the destruction of his fame, fortune, and national honor.  The failure of the 
French to capitalize on their success at Suez and complete the construction of the Panama Canal 
was foreshadowed in the flaws and oversights of de Lesseps himself, who misunderstood the 
terrain, the climate, and the challenges present in the route through Panama that simply had not 
existed in the desert during the construction of the Suez Canal.  Finally, after more than a decade 
of exhausting labor and rampant disease, de Lesseps’s canal corporation collapsed, leaving the 
French with nothing but a disgraced hero and a plethora of consequences.3 
 American interest in a Central American canal, for its part, had also begun shortly after 
the completion of the Suez Canal.  In 1869, President Grant established the Inter-Oceanic Canal 
Commission with the objective of discovering a faster shipping route between the eastern and 
western shores of the North American continent.  The resulting naval expedition to find such a 
new route lasted from 1870 to 1875, and concluded that a canal in Nicaragua was far more 
realistic than a canal through Panama, which was controlled by Colombia. Remarkably, the 
United States continued to favor a canal through Nicaragua over one in Panama until the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt moved swiftly and decisively towards a canal in Panama 
in 1903. 
  Accordingly, on November 2, 1903, the U.S.S. Nashville arrived in the Port of Colon.  
The next day, in an almost bloodless revolution, Panama secured its independence from 
Colombia.  The United States formally recognized Panama as a nation two days later, on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
 3Ibid., 124-203. 
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sixth of November. Soon after the successful overthrow of Colombian rule, on November 18, 
1903, the United States and Panama signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which gave the 
United States sovereignty over a fifty-mile wide area – the Canal Zone – all for an annual 
payment of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.  After the purchase of the French canal 
company, Compagnie Nouvelle, for forty million dollars, the United States could finally begin 
work on the canal to connect the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific across the Isthmus of 
Panama.4 
 Construction of the Panama Canal began in 1904 under the direction of chief engineer 
John Wallace, whose approach to the project almost immediately encountered the challenges of 
disease and poor living conditions that had hindered the French canal effort decades earlier. 
Wallace’s efforts towards the construction of the canal were hindered in part by his inability to 
sufficiently organize the Canal Project.  Under pressure to make tangible progress on the canal 
by politicians in America, work on the canal under the direction of Wallace was largely 
ineffective and inefficient.  Moreover, digging of the canal under the direction of Wallace was 
done in the shadow of spreading disease and poor living conditions, which was enough of a 
deterrent to send approximately three quarters of American canal workers back to the United 
States.5  
With work on the Panama Canal marred by the terrible conditions of the Canal Zone, 
Wallace resigned his post.  His successor, John Stevens, was much better prepared to tackle the 
challenges of constructing both the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone itself.  Stevens 
                                                            
 4Matthew Parker, Panama Fever: The Epic Story of One of the Greatest Human 
Achievements of All Time - The Building of The Panama Canal (New York:  Doubleday, 2007), 
200-252. 
 
  5 McCullough, 438-458. 
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immediately set about improving the standards of living of canal workers, and with the help of 
Dr. William Crawford Gorgas, the chief sanitary officer of the Canal Project, undertook a 
massive mosquito-eradication campaign in order to reduce the spread of disease among canal 
workers.  By prioritizing the task of making the Canal Zone a habitable location for workers, 
Stevens managed to set the course of the Canal Project back on track and enabled canal 
management to focus on the engineering difficulties of constructing the canal, rather than on the 
conditions in which the work was done.  Though Stevens only remained the chief engineer of the 
Canal Project for less than two years, his groundwork for the Panama Canal proved vital to the 
ultimate success of the canal.  When Stevens, too, resigned his post, he was replaced by the final 
chief engineer of the Canal Project, Colonel George Washington Goethals of the U.S. Army, 
who continued the successes and innovations introduced to the project by Stevens.  Though 
Goethals’s style of management was strict and unforgiving, work on the canal continued 
relatively unimpeded.6  
The canal project, once completed, was widely regarded as a success.  The canal was 
praised among others by Theodore Roosevelt, who proclaimed that “our fellow-countrymen on 
the Isthmus are working for our interest and for national renown in the same spirit and with the 
same efficiency that the men of the Army and Navy work in time of war.”7 The success of the 
United States in building the Panama Canal came at the necessary moment in history, a moment 
when revolution, technological and medical advances, and the rising prominence of a new 
western power converged to make the canal a reality.  The Panama Canal signaled newfound 
                                                            
  6 Ibid., 459-512. 
 
 7Theodore Roosevelt, Message of The President on The Panama Canal: Communicated 
to the two Houses of Congress, December 17, 1906 (South Milwaukee:  The Bucyrus Company, 
1907), 29. 
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American power in a world quickly divided into factions, war, and alliances, and became the 
great national triumph the French could never accomplish.8 
 However, the story of the construction of the Panama Canal is much more complex than a 
heralded national triumph, the failure of the French effort, or the genius of the team of engineers, 
designers, and overseers that guided the American attempt at a canal to its ultimate success.  This 
story involved sickness and disease, dangerous working conditions, and a compensation system 
that thoroughly segregated American workers from their non-white counterparts. 
 The idea of the gold and silver payrolls was not conceived exclusively by the American 
administrators who oversaw the construction of the canal, but rather the gold and silver 
definitions were part of the policies carried over from the days of the Panama Railroad.  In 1904, 
the Canal Project “adopted the railroad’s policy of different payrolls, gold for American citizens 
(somewhat higher than pay rates in the Unites States) and silver for noncitizens (somewhat 
higher than rates prevailing in the Caribbean basin).”9 However, establishing the gold and silver 
work force that would come to define the discrepancies in the living and working conditions of 
white and nonwhite canal labor was not a simple task.  Roughly one-third of the U.S. workforce 
on the Panama Canal was southern, but the Jim Crow segregation prevalent in the southern 
United States during the early twentieth century still managed to translate into a segregated 
Canal Zone society.10  Presented with an environment and cultural diversity altogether absent in 
the United States, most white laborers leveraged their positions as skilled tradesmen and as a 
white minority to gain higher wages and more attractive working conditions.  The unionization 
                                                            
 8Parker, 253-461. 
 
 9 Conniff, 32. 
 10 David R. Roediger and Elizabeth D. Esch, The Production of Difference: Race and the 
Management of Labor in U.S. History (New York:  Oxford University Press, Inc, 2012), 104. 
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of white labor also increased the power of white workers in the Canal Zone, and along with it 
developed “a southern-style division of labor where whites supervised and blacks did the heavy, 
dirty, disagreeable, yet increasingly skilled work."11  White labor enjoyed the benefits of a 
growing American economy as well, and the relatively weak interest in Canal Zone work from 
skilled workers within the United States left those willing to brave the rainforest and the 
dangerous work in a strong position to bargain for higher compensation and for what historian 
Michael L. Conniff  labeled “exceptional fringe benefits.”12  American workers increasingly 
sought to capitalize on their perceived value to the construction efforts, and white labor unions 
that represented American canal workers even went so far as to hire lobbyists in Washington to 
push the demands of white workers into the agendas of congressional lawmakers.13  
 To combat the willingness of white workers to strike or slow down work on the canal, the 
administrators of the Canal Zone used the vast numbers of black laborers to their advantage, 
capitalizing on “the threat of replacing [white workers] with West Indian blacks.”14  But more 
effectively, American labor managers applied the lessons of capitalist management in the United 
States to help deter strikes from breaking out among white workers.  Canal managers treated the 
problem of labor disputes seriously, and “employees might find themselves fired and 
blacklisted… if they engaged in labor activism.”15  Beyond the threat of job loss, strikes and 
                                                            
 11 Michael L. Conniff, Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama, 1904-1981 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 26. 
  12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Ibid. 
 
 14 Ibid., 51. 
 15 Ibid., 87. 
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other forms of interference with work in the Canal Zone were jeopardized by the presence of a 
highly-trained police force that maintained order within the zone.16 
 Due to the low retention rates among canal labor, the managers of the canal developed a 
consistent pool of black labor that drew largely from the West Indies, which they could utilize 
when more laborers were needed for the Canal Project.  Because of the vast number of black 
laborers that immigrated to Panama to work on the Panama Canal, “authorities devised a sui 
generis system of segregation based upon race and nationality.   It began as a simple color line, 
but soon took on more complexity, with graduations for American blacks, Europeans, whites, 
West Indians, and Panamanians.”17  But the establishment of a segregated Canal Zone society 
ultimately conflicted with the administrators’ use of the threat of black labor to quell the 
unionization and the subsequent strikes and work delays staged by gold roll employees.  The 
managers of the Canal Project “expected to find [blacks] a tractable and pliant source of labor,” 
but were met by increasing resistance from West Indian laborers as the construction of the 
Panama Canal progressed.18 
 The maintenance of the gold and silver work force in the Canal Zone was necessary to 
convince white workers that they continued to hold the dominant role in society as they had in 
the United States, but the disproportionate number of black laborers in comparison to white 
workers on the Canal Project convinced many silver employees that they were being 
purposefully excluded from the benefits of the gold force on the sole measure of race and 
ethnicity. 
                                                            
  16 Ibid. 
 
 17 Ibid., 43. 
  18 Julie Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal 
(New York:  The Penguin Press, 2009), 122. 
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 Yet the appeal of higher wages was not enough to combat the low levels of worker 
retention that plagued the construction of the Panama Canal and sapped the project of the skilled 
laborers as blacks and whites sought easier work and safer working conditions elsewhere. 
Especially key to the recruitment of skilled labor and managers from the United States was the 
set of perks and benefits that over time were allotted to gold employees.  Without the separation 
of all of Canal Zone society into the gold and silver forces, it would have been impossible for the 
administrators of the Canal Project to achieve a segregation so complete “that there was virtually 
no contact between persons of different races outside of working hours.”19 
 However, during the early years of the construction of the Panama Canal the gold 
designation was not exclusively reserved for white American workers.  For some time, American 
management of the Canal Project often used the gold definition as incentive for skilled black 
laborers, and for the entirety of the construction of the Panama Canal gold employees were 
overwhelmingly white Americans, but exceptions might be made for “a few Panamanian and 
West Indian trusties.”20  In fact, the criteria for becoming a gold employee was never outlined by 
American canal officials, likely because officials could not justify gold and silver distinctions 
without the mention of ethnicity as the greatest defining feature of gold and silver employees.  
By hiding the nature of the gold and silver forces and dismissing questions about the necessity of 
establishing a segregated Canal Zone society, officials managed to mitigate the consequences of 
discriminating against the majority of the Canal Zone workforce on the basis of race and 
prevented a backlash from black laborers in response to the racist policies adopted by American 
officials during the construction of the Panama Canal. 
                                                            
 19 Velma Newton, The Silver Men: West Indian Labour Migration to Panama 1850-1914 
(Kingston:   Ian Randle Publishers, 1984), 123. 
 20 Conniff, 33. 
10 
 
In spite of the racist undertones in the construction of the Panama Canal, current 
historical interpretations of the Panama Canal are divided between their focus on the remarkable 
feat of engineering, construction, and planning that the canal proved to be, and the conditions of 
labor that prevailed throughout the construction of the canal.  Early historical research into the 
Panama Canal and its construction  largely focused on the successes of the canal project in 
creating one of the largest and most complex structures in existence.21 
Furthermore, these works glorified the construction of the canal, casting it as a fantastic 
tale “about the transformation of a malaria-ridden swamp into a tropical utopia.”22  One such 
example of an idealistic interpretation of the construction of the Panama Canal was Frederic 
Haskin, who confessed that the purpose of his work was “to tell the layman the story of the 
Panama Canal" and claimed that, "The Panama Canal is the greatest engineering project of all 
history."23 However, though these early works were generally written in the period after the 
successful completion of the canal, they also touched on the racial tension found throughout the 
construction of the canal.  It was almost impossible not to note the contribution of non-whites to 
the construction effort:  according to Haskin, West Indians “contributed about 60 per cent of the 
brawn required to build the Panama Canal."24 
                                                            
 21For example, see Frederic J. Haskin, The Panama Canal (Garden City:  Doubleday, 
Page & Company, 1914); Logan Marshall, The Story of the Panama Canal: the Wonderful 
Account of the Gigantic Undertaking Commenced by the French, and Brought to Triumphant 
Completion by the United States; with a History of Panama from the Days of Balboa to the 
Present Time (Philadelphia:  L.T. Myers, 1913); W. Leon Pepperman, Who built the Panama 
Canal? (New York:   E.P. Dutton, 1915). 
 
 22Elizabeth McKillen, "The Panama Canal: Tropical Tropes and Working Class 
Realities," Diplomatic History, 35:1 (January 2011), 55. 
 
 23Haskin, 23. 
 
  24 Ibid., 154. 
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In line with the common societal beliefs of his time, Haskin went on to claim that “most 
of [the West Indians] worked about four days a week and enjoyed themselves the other three.” 25 
By choosing to believe in the perceived laziness and ineptitude of colored workers, these early 
historians gave insight into what were probably the views of American workers and supervisors 
on the gold and silver segregation system used during the construction of the Panama Canal.  
However, these works often relied heavily on the accounts of American supervisors of the 
Panama Canal, and the story of the construction of the canal from the eyes of black laborers was 
left conspicuously absent from these early historical accounts of the canal. 
The second group of historical interpretation pertaining to the Panama Canal fully 
explores the segregation and racial separation that accompanied the Panama Canal project, in 
addition to the general conditions of workers and the history of the construction of the canal from 
the viewpoint of the workers responsible for its construction.26  For historians such as Julie 
Greene, the canal project was as much a “conquest over the tens of thousands of men and women 
in the Canal Zone and in the Republic of Panama” as it was a triumph of modern engineering and 
technology. 27  In order to create a set of convincing historical arguments, this group of historians 
stressed the system of division among white and non-whites, skilled and unskilled labor:  the 
                                                            
 25Ibid., 154-155. 
 
 26For example, see Patrice C. Brown, "The Panama Canal: The African American 
Experience," Prologue Magazine, Federal Records and African American History, 29:2 
(Summer 1997), 1-5; Michael L. Conniff, Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama, 1904-1981 
(Pittsburgh:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); Julie Greene, "Spaniards on the Silver Roll: 
Labor Troubles and Liminality in the Panama Canal Zone, 1904-1914," International Labor and 
Working-Class History, 66 (Fall 2004), 78-98 and The Canal Builders: Making America's 
Empire at the Panama Canal (New York:  The Penguin Press, 2009); Alexander Missal, Seaway 
to the Future: American Social Visions and the Construction of the Panama Canal (Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008); Velma Newton, The Silver Men: West Indian Labour 
Migration to Panama 1850-1914 (Kingston:  Ian Randle Publishers, 1984). 
 
 27Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal, 4. 
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distinction of silver and gold workers.  As Michael L. Conniff argued, “Americans did not admit 
that they practiced Jim Crow segregation because it was not permitted under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Rather, they used the gold-silver system to disguise it.  For their part, silver 
workers had difficulty fighting segregation because they were not citizens.”28  
For both white and black workers on the Panama Canal, this clinging inequality was an 
undisputable fact.  The discrepancy in the value of white and black laborers to the management 
of the Panama Canal was made clear by the resources canal supervisors were willing to expend 
on the part of each group.  White American workers constituted only about one-fifth of all canal 
workers but were “treated fifteen times better in the way of free social facilities, sports, and 
amusements than was the black West Indian, who represented as much as three-quarters of the 
population.”29  In stark contrast to the benefits enjoyed by gold roll workers, black workers on 
the silver roll received little besides monetary compensation for the more dangerous and 
physically exhausting work they performed.  In 1914, the last year of construction on the Panama 
Canal, 353 black workers died as compared to 61 white workers. Between the dangers of disease 
and injury on the job, “the black laborer who had not spent time in the hospital was the 
exception.  Many were in and out three, four, five times.  Nor do the records show the numbers 
of men who were permanently maimed.”30  At the sites of the heaviest digging, death was not an 
uncommon occurrence among black laborers.  Explosions, many caused by prematurely-
detonated charges, were the cause of many deaths.  The worst accident involving explosives 
killed twenty-three men, yet still the digging continued, regardless of the sacrifice made in 
                                                            
 28Conniff, 5. 
 
  29 McCullough, 578. 
 
 30 Ibid., 582. 
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human lives to maintain the furious pace of work during the digging of the canal.31 As the work 
went on, men learned how to better prevent these tragedies, but the Canal Zone was dangerous in 
many more ways than the spectacular explosions and deadly diseases that gained much of the 
attention.  Particularly for black workers, death was such a regularity of work in the Canal Zone 
that fatalities were usually noted in a few lines among the pages of the Canal Record, the 
published journal of the Panama Canal.32 
Universal human mortality during the construction of the canal may have never been so 
dramatically displayed than through the violent accidents and explosions that characterized work 
on the Panama Railroad and within the Culebra Cut, but records of canal fatalities indicate that 
even death itself was a burden shared unequally between black and white canal workers. The 
death rate for white canal workers ran between six and a half and sixteen deaths per thousand 
employees, while the death rate amongst black workers fell between eight and forty-six per 
thousand laborers.33  Historian Michael L. Conniff placed a revised mortality estimate for black 
workers on the Panama Canal at approximately ten percent, based on the poor record keeping of 
the canal, which often failed to account for changes in name, occupation, and residency.34 
In addition to the poor working conditions experienced by black laborers, the living 
quarters and other facilities designated for use by silver roll employees were a far cry from those 
of white workers.  Poor treatment of black workers, moreover, was ignored and left unnoticed by 
most of the white population.  An account by Poultney Bigelow of a conversation with a 
                                                            
  31 Ibid., 546. 
 
 32 Ibid., 575. 
 
 33 Newton, 144. 
 
 34 Conniff, 31. 
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Jamaican canal worker served to highlight the general absence of knowledge whites in the Canal 
Zone had acquired about the condition of black laborers: 
On landing at Colon I started for a stroll of inquiry and soon fell into conversation 
with a splendid specimen of manhood, a negro such as would have been recruited 
with pride into the Tenth United States Cavalry. He said that he was trying to get 
back to Jamaica. He was a sick man, could walk with difficulty, his system 
weakened by malarious fever. Naturally I expressed surprise that he should be 
returning to Jamaica when the cry of Colon was for negro labor! He said he came 
here for work, but had been deceived—he found the place unfit to live in; he 
found that the wages which had been promised to him, $1.50 in gold, were paid in 
silver equal to $0.75; he found that these wages were not paid punctually, but 
after two weeks, and sometimes more.35 
 
Had this black laborer been the sole recipient of such discriminatory treatment to warrant his 
return to Jamaica, this dialogue might be discounted as an anomaly, but historical knowledge of 
the living and working conditions of the black canal worker show that this sort of experience was 
not uncommon amongst silver roll employees.  Bigelow’s narrative corroborates this view, 
proceeding shortly thereafter to note with surprise that “indeed the Jamaica negro spoke truth—
the steamer which sailed next day took away 400 negroes, all returning to Jamaica in disgust.”36  
In spite of such occurrences, however, white Americans in the Canal Zone and in the United 
States continued to remain ignorant of the daily injustices experienced by the segregation of 
Canal Zone society and by the function of the gold and silver roll system, which compounded 
and entrenched discriminatory practices against blacks into the fabric of the organizational 
structure of Canal Zone life, work, and pay. 
                                                            
  35 Poultney Bigelow, "Our Mismanagement at Panama." The Independent…Devoted to 
the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature and the Art, 
60:2979 (January 4, 1906), 10. 
 
  36 Bigelow, 10. 
 
15 
 
 Attempts by Canal Workers to unionize and strike were largely broken down by a few 
key factors:   the presence of a large labor pool that Canal Zone managers could utilize both as 
the number of laborers needed fluctuated and in the event of a strike, the unwillingness of 
workers of different ethnicities to cooperate in seeking better pay and a higher collective 
standard of living, and the power wielded by American managers and maintained by the well-
trained police force of the Canal Zone that allowed Goethals to take a hard line against any 
organization or group that obstructed the breakneck pace of construction critical to the Canal’s 
ultimate success.  The maintenance of these strategic advantages was hardly a secretive 
government agenda; during the course of hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on 
Interoceanic Canals, William H. Burr, a member of the Isthmian Canal Commission, remarked 
that “it is perfectly safe and good policy to get as much of that labor as you can; but I think this, 
Senator, that there must be on the Isthmus a surplusage of labor.  Otherwise we will have 
interminable strikes and everything in the nature of a strike.”37  Further demonstration of these 
tactics came during the strike undertaken by highly-skilled steam-shovel operators soon after 
Goethal’s appointment to the position of Chief Engineer.  Though Goethals, at the time, was 
beginning the difficult task of assuming control of the intricacies of the Canal Zone after the 
abrupt departure of Stevens, he still demonstrated his unwillingness to bend to the demands of 
disgruntled workers with a steady supply of willing strikebreakers at his back.  Although the 
strike lowered “excavation to a quarter of its previous level,” Goethals approached the situation 
tentatively and unhurriedly, quietly hiring a number of other qualified workers until work could 
go on without the participation of the striking steam shovel operators.  When the strikers finally 
                                                            
  37 U.S. Senate. Committee on Interoceanic Canals of the United States. Senate 
Investigation of Panama Canal Matters. Hearings in the Matter of the Senate Resolution adopted 
January 9, 1906, Providing for an Investigation of Matters relating to the Panama Canal, etc. 
59th Cong., 2d Sess., (January 11, 1906-February 12, 1907), 1573. 
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capitulated, they became an example to other workers contemplating unionization and strikes, 
forced into low-level jobs until they could work their way back up amongst the highest-paid 
workers in the Canal Zone.38 
 Canal management’s success in suppressing union activity in the ranks of its workers was 
more easily achieved in instances where the men causing the agitation or obstruction of work 
were regarded by the Americans as replaceable and interchangeable with the large numbers of 
West Indians willing to accept jobs in the Canal Zone.  A clear demonstration of this superior 
position of Canal Zone management came in early 1907, when approximately one thousand 
Spanish workers struck with the goal of forcing management to accept a wage raise for workers 
in the Culebra Cut.  The Zone police quickly subdued the violence that flared from the ranks of 
the strikers and the organizers behind the strike, and the incident quickly ended without serious 
delays in the work being done on the canal at the time of the strike.39 
 The American press, however, chose mostly to ignore the subject of labor issues that 
arose during the construction of the Panama Canal.  Whether this lack of coverage was a 
byproduct of a general American will to continue construction of the Panama Canal at full pace 
or whether the absence of Canal Zone labor disputes in American media represented the apathy 
of the American public towards the conditions of the Canal worker, the fact remains that the 
general population of the United States had little information regarding Canal Zone work with 
which to concern themselves.  News regarding labor unrest during the construction of the canal 
failed to receive significant press, though articles in American newspapers often noted the 
departures of United States officials as they conducted observational visits to the Canal Zone.  
                                                            
  38 Parker, 399. 
 
 39 Ibid., 390. 
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For example, an article dated May 1, 1908 in The New York Times was submitted under the title:  
“Samuel B. Donnelly, Secretary of the Board of Arbitration of the Building Trades, will sail for 
Panama next Monday on a mission the exact nature of which he will not at present disclose.”40 
 The reasoning behind the under-coverage, however, remains decidedly simple in light of 
the motivations of the American press.  Forced by monetary necessity to cater to the interests of 
the general public, American news and media sources likely steered away from focus on labor 
issues within the Canal Zone based on the widely-held American belief that canal workers had 
better jobs, higher pay, and more desirable benefits than their counterparts in the United States.  
In shaping the society that developed within the Canal Zone in ways that included the gold and 
silver roll system and the development of a wide range of recreational opportunities for workers, 
Americans participating in the construction of the canal inadvertently convinced the American 
public that the Canal Zone constituted a white man’s paradise; logically, therefore, reports of 
union activity and labor unrest within the ranks of canal workers likely struck most Americans as 
unwarranted and as unnecessarily endangering to the successful progress of work on the Panama 
Canal.  According to an article in the New York Times, dated Nov. 18, 1910, shortly before 
President Taft landed in Panama to begin his inspection of the Canal Zone, the demand made by 
fifteen hundred American workers for a rise in wages was quickly dismissed.  American officials 
chose to reject the demands of the workers and “declined to grant the [pay] increases, not 
considering any justification necessary for such action,” but noting that the typical wage level in 
the Canal Zone “is 60 cents an hour which is from 10 to 30 cents higher than in the United 
                                                            
 40 "Taft Starts for Panama: He will try to Settle Some Troubles on the Isthmus," New 
York Times, 57:18,360 (May 1, 1908), 2. 
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States.”41  The reasoning of the American officials in this instance appears to run in parallel to 
the attitude of the American public, and the belief that “10 to 30 cents” in additional wages and 
no lack of added benefits more than made up for the drawbacks of work in the Canal Zone 
probably served to dissolve remaining American interest in the priorities and demands of canal 
workers.42 
 Though ultimately little was done to further improve the quality of life in the Canal Zone 
after the initial period of domestic focus promoted by Stevens as part of the groundwork for the 
canal’s construction, an investigation into the standards of living of canal workers was conducted 
by Gertrude Beeks, the Secretary of the Welfare Department of the National Civic Federation. 
Beeks observed the quality of life, recreation, and nutrition of workers in the Canal Zone and 
compiled her notes and opinions into an unbiased picture of the lives of canal employees as 
construction progressed on the Panama Canal.  She noticed quickly that:  
the quarters of the employees are of several types. There are houses for married 
employees, American whites, Europeans and West Indian negroes; barracks (for 
bachelors who are clerks or American mechanics) which contain several rooms, 
each holding from two to four men; dormitory barracks for Europeans, in which 
there are cot bunks—60, 72 or 84 in each house—and similar separate dormitory 
barracks for West Indians. 43 
 
The report did little to avoid the truth about the subpar conditions that West Indians and other 
silver roll employees experienced, noting the cramped, dirty housing for black laborers and 
suggesting that the quality of the food had improved only as a result of the Beeks’ inspection 
                                                            
 41 "Labor Row Starts as Mr. Taft Sails: Twenty-five Percent of the American Workers on 
the Canal May Quit Their Jobs," New York Times, 60:19,291 (November 18, 1910), 1.  
 
 42 Ibid. 
 
 43 Gertrude Beeks, "Panama Canal Conditions," American Federationist: Official 
Magazine of the American Federation of Labor, 14:11 (November 1907), 850. 
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itself.  Beeks additionally discussed the labor structure of the canal, criticizing the system under 
which “the eight hour day… applies only to the 4,000 mechanics; then there are 33,884 laborers 
who work from 10 to 14 hours a day – at wages not mentioned – and these laborers seem to have 
few privileges in regard to… things which tend to make conditions more endurable.”44  Beeks’ 
final conclusion placed the blame for the poor conditions squarely on the shoulders of the 
American government, writing scathingly that “it is the treatment of these many thousands of 
unskilled laborers—they who actually dig the ditch—which gives food for thought and makes 
one wonder if this government, spending unlimited millions, can not do better for these, its 
employees.”45  Outside of the language of the report, however, Beeks’ contribution to the quality 
of life of the common Canal Zone laborer was minute, and poor conditions for unskilled laborers 
persisted for the duration of the construction of the Panama Canal.  
 Alongside Beeks’ failure to spark change in the lives of canal laborers, her report also 
failed to confront many of the inequalities created by the system of labor and life in the Canal 
Zone and reinforced by the gold and silver roll system maintained by canal administrators. 
Beeks’ report occasionally used the terms “black” and “West Indian,” but appeared to view black 
labor on the canal as a separate issue from “unskilled labor.” As a representative of a government 
without reason to concern itself with the quality of life of its noncitizen workers, Beeks had no 
external motivation to promote equality within Canal Zone society. Instead, as a representative 
of a government tasked with the responsibility of maintaining suitable conditions for its own 
native workers, Beeks’ attention was likely directed towards the improvement of the lives of 
white canal employees.  Whether or not it ran parallel with Beeks’ own views on the conditions 
of the Panama Canal, Beeks’ report was ultimately most relevant to the officials who examined it 
                                                            
 44 Ibid., 865. 
 
 45 Ibid., 866. 
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through its critiques and observations of the quality of life of whites engaged in the construction 
of the canal. 
 While the poor standards of living of West Indians and other nonwhite laborers during 
the construction of the Panama Canal were widely recognized by the reports of figures such as 
Beeks and Bigelow, the government’s lack of acknowledgement and response to these issues was 
primarily allowed by fault of virtually nonexistent concern among the American public in 
regards to the conditions of black employees and the complaints of labor forces within the 
workforce of the Canal Zone.  Any proponents of canal labor reform would have met the 
stonewall of the general willingness to believe in the Canal Zone as a near-paradise on earth, and 
Americans as a whole found it simpler to ignore any signs that the society constructed by 
American officials during the construction of the canal was only perfect at face-value.  The 
benefits and facilities reserved for gold roll employees constituted a segregated paradise, but for 
Americans both within the Canal Zone and within the United States inaction remained the easier 
solution.  The United States of the early twentieth century did not desire debate or discussion on 
the subject of inequality between canal workers, and the nation was certainly not willing to divert 
its attention from the successful completion of the Panama Canal towards issues of reform it was 
not ready to confront in a foreign land.  Moreover, Americans were far from eager to center the 
subject of segregation around laborers for whom it held no responsibility, a nation it bore little 
obligation to, and a manufactured society that would quickly lose relevance in the minds of the 
American people soon after the completion of their first great achievement as an international 
power. 
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